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THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN SUDAN,  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ORAL HISTORIES OF THE  
SUDANESE DIASPORA IN AMERICA 
Matthew Kustenbauder
Introduction
Since  independence,  Sudan  has  experienced  two  civil  wars  that  have 
devastated entire regions and caused untold human su fering. The   rst 
began in 1955 and was settled in 1972. The second war, often considered 
a continuation of the   rst, started in 1983 and lasted until a peace agree-
ment was reached in January 2005. Recent estimates suggest that the sec-
ond civil war alone exacted a penalty of more than two million deaths 
and uprooted the lives of over four million people.  Widespread violence, 
destruction, and displacement have stretched state, social, and economic 
structures to the breaking point.
In most popular accounts, the cause of the   ghting is characterized as 
a con  ict between the Muslim north and the Christian south.  Such a 
  A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the “Conference on Religion and 
Religious Identities in Africa and the African Diaspora” at Western Michigan University, 
Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA, 9–12 October 2008. I also wish to thank Alice Kustenbauder, 
David  Bargueño,  Michael  Mahoney,  Rebecca  Lorins,  Carol  Gallo,  Dianna  English,  and  
Mircea Raianu for their criticisms and suggestions. 
  Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, and Atta El-Batahani, “Sudan’s Civil War: 
Why has it Prevailed for so Long?” in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, ed. 
Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), 193.
  Recent examples of popular accounts of the long history of civil war in Sudan include 
books and   lms, most of which were produced following the arrival to the United States 
of some 3,800 so-called “Lost Boys,” that is, Sudanese refugees who were orphaned and/
or displaced by the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). After the terrorist attacks 
on New York City and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the resettlement program 
was suspended due to security concerns. Films intended for popular consumption situ-
ated the story of Sudanese immigration to the United States within the framework of a 
clash between Islam and the West. Megan Mylan and Jon Shenk, directors, Lost Boys of 
Sudan (Actual Films/ Principe Productions, 2003), DVD, open their documentary with 
these words: “Civil war has ravaged Sudan . . . the Islamic fundamentalist government is 
waging war on the Christian and Animist South.” Christopher Quinn, director, God Grew 
Tired of Us (Newmarket Films, 2006), DVD, o fers a slightly more sophisticated telling of 
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stereotype renders a complex local con  ict into basic universal terms, one 
in which the hostilities in Sudan are re  ective of a global clash of cultures, 
pitting  Islam  against  the  West.  It  points  toward  religion  and  religious 
identity as fundamental sources of con  ict throughout the history of the 
world.  Scholars whose work focuses on Sudan, however, have generally 
looked to a more historically contingent combination of political, envi-
ronmental, and economic factors. During the colonial era, British o   cials 
recruited Arabic-speaking northerners, who became a bourgeois class of 
petty bureaucrats charged with running the colonial administration. Poli-
cies of indirect rule, which were applied more vigorously after the 1920s 
to combat nationalist stirrings, culminated in the 1930 “Southern Policy,” 
which isolated peripheral areas of Sudan—especially the south—leaving 
them undeveloped and thus unprepared for political independence.  In 
addition, there has always existed competition, especially between the 
northern  and  southern  regions,  for  scarce  resources,  including:  labor, 
prime agricultural and grazing land, the Nile waters, and rich mineral and 
oil reserves. These and other sources of con  ict in Sudan suggest that the 
issue of religion is but one factor among many. 
Sudan’s history, which acknowledges a legacy of British colonialism that divided north and 
south, but in the end describes the principal cleavage as a religious one. More recently, Jen 
Marlowe, director, Rebuilding Hope: Sudan’s Lost Boys Return Home (Cinema Libre Studio, 
2009), DVD, follows the journey of three “Lost Boys” who, now in their twenties, return 
to South Sudan “to discover whether their homes and families had survived, what the 
current situation is in South Sudan, and how they can help their community rebuild after 
devastating civil war.” A number of popular books written by or with Sudanese refugees 
about their experiences also implicate religion as a primary cause of con  ict in Sudan. 
Some examples of these include: Francis Bok, Escape from Slavery: The True Story of My Ten 
Years in Captivity—And My Journey to Freedom in America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2003); Mende Nazer, Slave (New York: Public A fairs, 2003); Mark Bixler, The Lost Boys of 
Sudan: An American Story of the Refugee Experience (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
2005); Benson Deng, et al., They Poured Fire on Us from the Sky: The True Story of Three 
Lost Boys from Sudan (New York: Public A fairs, 2005); Dave Eggers, What is the What: The 
Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng (San Francisco: McSweeney’s, 2006); John Bul Dau, 
God Grew Tired of Us (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2007); Ayuel Leek Deng, Beny 
Ngor Chol, and Barbara Youree, Courageous Journey: Walking the Lost Boys’ Path from the 
Sudan to America (Far Hills: New Horizon Press, 2008); and Aher Arop Bol, The Lost Boy 
(Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2009), which di fers from most of the other published accounts 
by Sudanese resettled in America in that it tells the story of Bol’s   ight from Sudan to 
South Africa.
  Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Touchstone, 1997).
  One of the best accounts of Sudan’s colonial past and its legacies is Heather Sharkey, 
Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003).
  Whereas the political and economic forces fueling the con  ict have been analyzed 
from a wide variety of perspectives, this essay focuses on the religious dimensions of what 
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This chapter draws upon interviews with members of the Sudanese 
diaspora living in the United States to explore the question of religion’s 
role in the con  ict. Of the estimated   ve million Sudanese displaced by 
war, a small percentage has managed to gain resettlement placements in 
countries beyond those that border Sudan. North America and Australia 
have become key destinations, with over 20,000 Sudanese refugees reset-
tled in the United States since the early 1990s.  As a people on the move, 
Sudanese in the diaspora o fer a unique window into the lived experi-
ence of globalization and the linkages with those who remain in Africa. 
To what extent do they identify religion as a major factor in the war, and 
how might their own position as members of a transnational diaspora 
shape their religious identity and in  uence their telling of Sudan’s his-
tory and its future trajectory? The   ndings reveal that, on the surface, 
there is agreement within the Sudanese diaspora—despite their di fer-
ent faiths—regarding the precise function of religious identity in Sudan’s 
wars: namely, all those interviewed hold the position that religion is not 
the root cause of the hostilities, but political elites have deployed religious 
rhetoric opportunistically as a weapon and a defensive shield in what is 
  rst and foremost a struggle for political control. Nevertheless, conver-
sations were delimited by a certain discursive paradigm that relied on 
binary categories to explain Sudan’s post-independence history: Muslim-
Christian, Arab-African, and north-south.
This chapter argues that the language of politicized religion operates as 
part of a hegemonic narrative about the local con  ict in Sudan, a con  ict 
that has become globalized as opposing northern and southern factions 
reached  out  to  foreign  actors  for  material,  ideological,  and  diplomatic 
support.  It  also  considers  the  ways  in  which  the  terms  of  this  global-
ized discourse have shaped Sudanese identity, and how Sudanese living  
has become one of the world’s longest surviving and most lethal civil wars. Signi  cant 
publications on the social, economic, and political causes of con  ict include: M. W. Daly 
and Ahmed A. Sikainga, Civil War in the Sudan (London: British Academic Press, 1993); 
Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, Ethnicity and Con lict in the Horn of Africa (Oxford: 
James Curry, 1994); Sharon Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the 
State (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996); David Keen, “A Rational Kind of 
Madness,” Oxford Development Studies 25, no. 1 (1997); Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of 
Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997); Human 
Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, 1998: The Human Rights Causes (New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1999), and Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000); 
Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 2003).
  Dianna J. Shandy, “Nuer Christians in America,” Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no. 2 
(2002): 213.
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outside Sudan have adopted its language—in their oral testimonies, reli-
gious rituals, cultural practices, political activism, and relief e forts—to 
understand the con  ict and their place in it. Assessments of Sudan’s past 
and present by refugees and political asylum seekers living in America 
incorporate into the historical record diasporic voices that shed light on 
the interconnected processes and socio-political dynamics at work in the 
globalization of religious identities, the construction and maintenance of 
communities across national borders, the entrenchment of con  icts, and 
even the birth of new nations.
Each of the nine Sudanese with whom I spoke came to the United 
States as a result of displacement by war, or in order to escape politi-
cal persecution. Three came from the north and identi  ed themselves as 
Muslim; six were southern Christians.  There are obvious limitations to 
such a small sample size. Given their location in university towns on the 
northeast coast of the United States, their views may re  ect a level of edu-
cational attainment, class status, or social outlook that is unrepresentative 
of the Sudanese diaspora in the United States or elsewhere. While such 
shortcomings are valid and should be kept in mind, they do not pose a 
signi  cant problem for the arguments developed below. This is because 
the interviews are read alongside an already rich repository of   rst-hand 
written  accounts  and  secondary  literature,  all  of  which  illustrate  how 
the dynamics of religious identity formation are linked to processes of 
globalization at the national and interregional level. Indeed, one of the 
reasons to include these voices from the diaspora is that their individual 
stories may be understood as oral performances, a way for Sudanese liv-
ing in America to actively construct their identity, imagine themselves as 
members of a collective life rooted in Sudan, and act as individual agents 
capable of providing material and political assistance. 
One recurrent theme in the interviews was the manipulation of reli-
gion by both Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
in  order  to  mobilize  popular  support  at  home  and  win  political  allies 
abroad. Many scholars have noted the politicization of religion as a tacti-
cal maneuver in Sudan’s wars, especially with regard to the north.   This 
   The “Sources” section at the end of this chapter provides details about each infor-
mant. To protect their privacy, however, I have changed all personal names, drawing from 
names common in Sudan.
   See Felicia McMahon, Not Just Child’s Play: Emerging Tradition and the Lost Boys of 
Sudan (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007).
   See Einas Ahmed, “Political Islam in Sudan: Islamists and the Challenge of State 
Power,” in Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa, ed. Benjamin F. Soares and Rene Otayek, 
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is to be expected, since the Sudanese Islamist party, the National Islamic 
Front (NIF), came to power in 1989 with the explicit project of establish-
ing a nationwide Islamic political order.   Yet few studies have devoted 
signi  cant attention to understanding how Christianity and Christianiza-
tion became an identity of resistance, and therefore a political tool in the 
SPLA’s struggle against Khartoum. One exception is Francis Deng, who 
has noted how, through a dialogical process, a strikingly similar set of 
logics, language, and practices of politicized religion in the south came 
to mirror those in the north. Deng writes, “What they (the Northerners) 
do not realize is that traditional identity and Christian Western in  uence 
have combined to consolidate and strengthen a modern southern identity 
of resistance against Islamization and Arabization. Forced assimilation is 
no longer possible, if it ever was.”   In this sense, southern Sudan’s iden-
ti  cation with Christianity, and the deployment of that identity to garner 
international support and   ght a war against a Muslim-dominated gov-
ernment, is a story that requires more attention, especially now with the 
creation of an independent southern state.  
While it is easy to accuse political rivals or cultural “others” of manipu-
lating religious sentiments, it is far more di   cult to recognize the ways 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Jean-Philippe Platteau, “Political Instrumentaliza-
tion of Islam and the Risk of Obscurantist Deadlock,” World Development, 39, no. 2 (2011); 
Heather Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnic-
ity, and Race,” African A fairs 107, no. 426 (2008).
   Since Sudan’s independence, a series of military rulers turned politicians have nego-
tiated for political control with the National Islamic Front, headed by the revered cleric 
Hassan al-Turabi. Although the National Congress Party (NCP) has been the o   cial gov-
erning party of Sudan since Omar al-Bashir seized power in a military coup on 30 June 
1989, many consider the NCP to have been a legal cover for the NIF and credit al-Turabi 
with institutionalizing sharia law at a national level and mobilizing the war e fort against 
the south in the 1990s.
   Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Con lict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1995), 205. See also Amir H. Idris, Con lict and Politics of Identity in 
Sudan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
   The Republic of South Sudan o   cially became an independent country in July 2011. 
After nearly 99 percent of southerners voted to secede in a January 2011 referendum, Presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir pledged his support, saying, “Secession has become a reality . . . we 
will support the new southern state . . . we are neighbors and will remain friends.” Khaled 
Abdelaziz, “Sudan’s Bashir pledges support for independent south,” Reuters, 25 January 
2011. For recent works on the future of Sudan, see Francis M. Deng, ed. New Sudan in the 
Making? Essays on a Nation in Painful Search of Itself (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2010); Alan 
Schwartz, Scenarios for Sudan Avoiding Political Violence Through 2011 (United States Insti-
tute of Peace Special Report, 2009); Edward Thomas, Against the Gathering Storm Securing 
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (London: Royal Institute of International A fairs, 
2009); Andrew S. Natsios and Michael Abramowitz, “Sudan’s Secession Crisis: Can the 
South Part from the North without War?” Foreign A fairs 90, no. 1 (2011). 
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in which one’s own religious identity has been shaped by local political 
projects (i.e., construction of a separate southern Sudanese identity). Such 
projects and the forms of belonging they invoke have their own logic of 
inevitable exclusion of the “other,” even if they are an inadvertent con-
sequence of the community’s struggle for survival.   One way to get at 
these social dynamics that function at the level of individual conscious-
ness  is  through  the  analysis  of  oral  histories,  which  actively  work  out 
notions of personhood and its relationship to wider communities—such 
as national, religious, ethnic or class groupings—through narrative con-
struction. In the case of southern Sudanese informants, for instance, their 
testimonies provide evidence of the politicization of Christianity in the 
south, which has functioned as a means of military resistance, political 
mobilization, and social control. It is a good example of what Elizabeth 
Tonkin has referred to as “being witnesses in spite of themselves.”   Those 
interviewed didn’t intend to raise the issue of religion’s politicization to 
serve the SPLA’s objectives, but this important information emerged in 
their oral performances. Equally clear was the extent to which politicized 
religious identities and competing visions of the nation have been shaped, 
solidi  ed, and exported through global diasporic connections.
Khartoum and the Islamist State
Sudan’s con  icted history, narrated by Sudanese living in the United States, 
emerges as a story of the manipulation of religious identity by the north-
ern government for political purposes. Chol Alier, a Sudanese immigrant 
from southern Sudan educated at Michigan State, the University of San 
Diego, and Yale, argues that the con  ict in Sudan is fundamentally about 
politics. “The problem that lies at the heart of the con  ict in Sudan is the 
issue of governance . . . more than race or even religion.”   Summarizing 
a list of grievances voiced by each of the other southerners interviewed, 
   For a discussion on political processes of exclusion and belonging, see Peter Geschiere 
and F. Nyamnjoh, “Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and Belonging,” 
Public Culture 12, no. 2 (2000); Peter Geschiere, “Autochthony and Citizenship: New Modes 
in the Struggle for Belonging and Exclusion in Africa,” Quest: An African Journal of Philoso-
phy 18 (2005); Peter Geschiere and S. Jackson, “Autochthony and the Crisis of Citizenship: 
Democratization, Decentralization, and the Politics of Belonging,” African Studies Review 
49, no. 2 (2006).
   Elizabeth Tonkin, Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 83f.
   Peter Chol Alier, interview by author, 19 November 2007.
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Chol points out that Sudan’s political history since the colonial period has 
been characterized by the marginalization of non-Arabs, the partition of 
north and south, unequal development, the extraction of resources, and 
the concentration of political power among elites in Khartoum. This per-
spective is one we might expect from someone displaced by the war.
However, criticism of Khartoum’s exclusionary politics was not unique 
to southern Sudanese. A northern Sudanese Arab and former journalist, 
Mutasim Allah, now runs a small pan-African mutual assistance associa-
tion in New Haven, Connecticut, called African Community Development 
Council. He too blames the Government of Sudan (GoS) for perpetuat-
ing an unrepresentative system of governance, failing to develop outly-
ing regions while channeling resources directly to Khartoum, and using 
religion as a pressure mechanism to perpetuate an unjust and oppres-
sive  regime.  “The  issue  of  religion  has  been  heavily  politicalized  [sic] 
in Sudan . . . that is problematic because it is the government that is to 
blame, not Islam as a religion.”   A devout Muslim, Mutasim worries that 
the northern government’s tactics not only divide the country, but also 
bring dishonor to Islam.
These statements by Chol Alier and Mutasim Allah challenge the popu-
lar account of Sudan’s wars as a clash of cultures, arguing instead that the 
con  ict is fundamentally about political control. Yet, in their discussion 
of the con  ict and in their own sympathies, they reinforce the bipolar 
image of a war between Sudan’s Arab and Muslim north, and African and 
Christian south. This is hard to avoid, especially given the dominance of 
a narrative focused on the north-south national cleavage and the fact that 
Chol and Mutasim identify themselves as belonging to each of the domi-
nant opposing communities. Nevertheless, there are many other groups 
within Sudan whose local struggle does not   t neatly within the pattern 
of a cultural clash. One well-known example is Darfur.  
   Mutasim Allah, interview by author, 5 December 2007.
   Darfur is a predominantly Muslim area located in western Sudan and historically 
considered, at least politically, part of the north. Nevertheless, Darfuris have long su fered 
marginalization under Khartoum’s rule. See Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: 
Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009); Salah M. Hassan  
and Carina E. Ray, eds., Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History 
of a Long War (New York: Zed Books, 2008); Gérard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Geno-
cide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); and Alex de Waal, “Who are the Darfurians? 
Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement,” African A fairs 101, no. 415 
(2005). Myriad dissenting factions have struggled for a political voice in Sudan. On margin-
alized groups in the north see Ahmed, “Political Islam in Sudan: Islamists and the Challenge 
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Interviews with Darfur refugees make it clear that Muslim-Christian 
antagonism need not be present in order for elites to deploy religious 
ideology as a means of suppressing political opposition, exerting social 
control, and justifying the use of force to broadcast state power. Yasir 
Hamata, a Sudanese Muslim from Darfur who, like Mutasim Allah, came 
to the United States seeking political asylum, points out that even in Dar-
fur, where all inhabitants are Muslim, the government still uses Islam as a 
tool of social and political control. “The current regime in Sudan practices 
a  separate  and  rule  policy . . . religious  divisions  are  a  smokescreen  for 
the larger political issue—Khartoum takes and does not give, people are 
alienated from their power.”   Alamaldin Tajir, another Darfuri, explains 
that because Islam is so malleable, it has been used by the government 
to  prevent  people  from  organizing  political  opposition  to  Khartoum.   
“For  example,  according  to  the  religion,  alcohol  is  haraam,  but  we’ve 
always had traditional alcohol in Darfur until the government came in 
with a ‘new’ Islam, which was an excuse to harass people . . . now most of 
Darfur is burning.”   There is no disputing the fact that the GoS has been 
unwilling to develop Darfur or to give Darfuris equal political say. The 
only sign of progress they observe are the pipelines that carry oil across 
of State Power.” In southern Sudan the Dinka-dominated SPLA has not escaped factional 
splits and dissention either. See Douglas H. Johnston, “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
and the Problem of Factionalism,” in African Guerillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: 
James Curry, 1998); and Sharon Hutchinson, “Nuer Ethnicity Militarized,” Anthropology 
Today 16, no. 3 (2000). The Nuba, meanwhile, who occupy an “ethno-cultural transitional 
zone along the south-north political dichotomy,” su fer doubly from marginalization by 
Khartoum’s policies of Islamization and Arabization and exclusion from Dinka-dominated 
SPLA politics. See Guma Kunda Komey, “Land Factor in Wars and Con  icts in Africa: The 
Case of the Nuba Struggle in Sudan,” in War and Peace in Africa, ed. Toyin Falola and 
Raphael Chijioke Njoku (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 360.
   Yasir Hamata, interview by author, 30 November 2007.
   Alamaldin Tajir, interview by author, 30 November 2007. By his repeated references 
to a “new Islam” encroaching on village life, Alamaldin seems to be referring to a form of 
Islamic fundamentalism. There is a long debate about whether the word “fundamentalist”  
is  accurate  in  discussing  political  Islam.  Many  scholars  prefer  the  term  “Islamist”  to 
describe contemporary political Islamic movements. On the local dynamics of Islamist 
movements in Sudan, see Victoria Bernal, “Gender, Culture, and Capitalism: Women and 
the Remaking of Islamic Tradition in a Sudanese Village,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 36 (1994), and “Islam, Transnational Culture, and Modernity in Rural Sudan,” 
in Gendered Encounters: Challenging Cultural Boundaries and Social Hierarchies in Africa, 
ed. M. Grosz-Ngate and O. Kokole (New York: Routledge, 1997), 131–51. Bernal o fers insight 
into how “Islamist” movements work in transforming local understandings of culture, and, 
in contrast to Alamaldin Tajir’s description, points out that Islamic reform while encour-
aged by the government, frequently emerges at the grassroots through the initiative of 
local agents.
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the barren landscape to Khartoum, meanwhile Darfuris have been sys-
tematically excluded from government ministries.  
The situation in Darfur has not escaped the attention of southerners, 
either, many of whom view the   ghting in Darfur as an extension of the 
southern struggle for a new Sudan. “At long last, [the people of Darfur] 
understand  what  the  northern  government  is  doing,  they  have    nally 
woken up in 2003 to   ght for their rights,” explains Ajak Mapak, a south-
ern Sudanese studying accounting at Bentley College in Boston. “Religion 
was used for a long time to divide Africans, but now they have under-
stood they were being manipulated.”   Ajak’s sentiments were echoed by 
the other southern Sudanese Christians interviewed; they saw themselves 
as standing in solidarity with all peoples in the marginalized regions of 
Sudan—regardless of religion, race, or culture—who seek more fair politi-
cal representation.  
Taken together, these oral histories highlight the exclusionary dimen-
sion  of  Khartoum’s  postcolonial  rule,  which  hardened  already-existing   
divisions  and  accelerated  divergent  processes  of  identity  formation  in 
Sudan.  Yasir  Hamata’s  characterization  of  these  policies  as  those  of  
“separate and rule” also point toward the way in which the Islamist state-
building project in Sudan represents (for many ordinary people on the 
ground) the extension of colonial practices, ideologies, and structures of 
governance by a cadre of metropolitan elites. When independence came 
in 1956, external colonizers Britain and Egypt handed over the reins of 
government  to  British-educated,  Arab  bureaucrats—“the  colonizers 
within”—whose vision of a modern Sudanese nation-state invoked, as a 
   Yasir Hamata, interview by author, 30 November 2007; Mutasim Allah, interview by 
author, 5 December 2007. See also Aleksi Ylönen, “Grievances and the Roots of Insurgen-
cies: Southern Sudan and Darfur,” Peace, Con lict and Development: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal 7 (July 2005): 109.
   Abraham Ajak Mapak, interview by author, 25 November 2007.
   Peter Bok, “Sudan: A Future Beyond Genocide,” lecture given at Yale University, 
New Haven, CT, 7 November 2007; Atem Ajak, interview by author, 2 December 2007; 
Peter Chol Alier, interview by author, 19 November 2007; Diing Ayuel, interview by author, 
2 December 2007; Deng Bol, interview by author, 2 December 2007. In this regard, my 
informants exhibit an ecumenism born out of a desire for social justice in Sudan. On the 
observation that John Garang and the SPLA framed the southern cause to include anyone 
who was marginalized by and stood against Khartoum, see Rebecca Lorins, “Inheritance: 
Kinship and the Performance of Sudanese Identities” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Texas at Austin, 2007). Her chapter on the Kwoto Cultural Center, especially, shows how 
displaced southerners in the north rehearsed various versions of “southernness” in order 
to intervene in historical debates over what it means to be southern and in contemporary 
contests over the shape of an aspired southern state.
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parallel to the European mission civilisatrice, the idea of spreading Arab 
civilization  and  Islamic  religion.    Indeed,  there  is  good  evidence  that 
the GoS pursued a policy of Islamization for the country almost from the 
moment of independence. Since at least 1971, civil courts in Sudan were 
required to use sharia law as a source of their decisions, in the absence 
of other legislation. In 1983, the infamous September laws were passed, 
including the Basic Judgments Act requiring civil courts to apply sharia 
law, notwithstanding other legislative provisions. This e fectively marked 
the Islamization of all laws in Sudan and their application to all citizens, 
regardless of religious, ethnic, or regional a   liation.   One scholar has 
called this the “crisis of postcolonial citizenship” in Sudan, emblematic of 
the failure of so many postcolonial African states to construct a cosmopol-
itan and plural national identity.   Instead, Sudan attempted to impose a 
“single vision of the nation” through homogenizing policies of Arabization 
and Islamization, and, when these failed, through a series of wars against 
its own citizens.
If the problem in Sudan is political at its core, what is the origin of its 
historical account as religious incitement? And why has it retained such 
in  uence in the telling of Sudanese history, particularly in the United 
States? One answer is that it emanated from within Sudan itself. “The reli-
gious narrative that has always been put as the de  nition of the con  ict in 
Sudan,” suggests Chol Alier, “came from Khartoum as a way of belittling 
the SPLM/A [Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army] as a separat-
ist group interested in dividing the country . . . inciting fear in the pub-
lic and . . . chang[ing] Arab and Islamic identity and culture.”   Religion 
was used as a tactic to discredit those the government perceived to be its 
   See Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Di ferent Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and 
the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); and Heather Shar-
key, Living with Colonialism.
   The 1983 September Laws were tantamount to the GoS tearing up the 1972 Addis 
Ababa peace agreement, which ended the First Sudanese Civil War by creating a Southern 
Sudan Autonomous Region exempt from Islamic law. President Numeiri’s 1983 declaration 
of all Sudan as an Islamic state foisted sharia on the south and revoked it’s automony. This 
is cited by southerners as the primary reason for the formation of the SPLM/A and a return 
to war. See Hasan and Gray, Religion and Con lict in Sudan, 80–81. See also Ahmed, “Politi-
cal Islam in Sudan: Islamists and the Challenge of State Power”; Sharkey, “Arab Identity 
and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race”; and Platteau, “Politi-
cal Instrumentalization of Islam and the Risk of Obscurantist Deadlock.”
   Idris, Con lict and Politics of Identity in Sudan, 3, 4, 18, 109.
   Peter Chol Alier, interview by author, 19 November 2007.
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enemies, on the one hand, and to mobilize support for the government’s 
policies, on the other.
In this regard, fostering a popular narrative that the war with southern 
Sudan was a “war of religions” bene  ted the GoS in several ways. First, it 
attracted external support from Muslims in other Islamic countries, who 
saw it as their duty to help Khartoum defend and expand the boundaries 
of Islam. Indeed, as early as 1966, during the First Sudanese Civil War, 
the country’s leadership attempted to enlist the support of other Muslim 
countries in establishing political control over the South, reminding them: 
“The failure of Islam in the Southern Sudan would be the failure of . . . the 
international Islamic cause. Islam has a holy mission in Africa, and South-
ern Sudan is the beginning of that mission.”  
Second, such a narrative consolidated and activated political support 
for Khartoum among Muslims residing within Sudan. As Chol points out, 
“Those in power . . . know very well that southern [Sudan] is only one third 
of the country . . . and for the most part Christian. So if you portray their 
resistance as a war of religion against Islam, then you are guaranteed to 
get one hundred percent support from two-thirds of the country; that is, 
the northern part.”   In other words, categorizing the con  ict in terms of 
religious identity gave Muslims in Sudan a common enemy and an incen-
tive to support Khartoum despite their grievances with the government. 
Given the increased incidence of unrest throughout Sudan among Mus-
lims following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in 2005, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the end of the civil war has 
made it ever more di   cult for the government to unite and manage the 
country’s diverse Muslim population. No longer compelled to rally behind 
national leaders in order to preserve Islamic solidarity,   ssures within and 
between Muslim communities are erupting.  
   Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the Umma Party, quoted in Yusuf Fadl Hasan and Richard 
Gray, eds., Religion and Con lict in Sudan: Papers from an International Conference at Yale, 
May 1999 (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 2002), 37.
   Peter Chol Alier, interview by author, 19 November 2007. His comment that Khar-
toum’s politicization of religion gave the GoS full support in their war against the south 
is an exaggeration. It characterizes the north as an undi ferentiated monolith and ignores 
the extent to which government power has been contested in order to accentuate the 
position of the southerners as underdogs. It should be remembered that John Garang and 
the SPLA had the support of Mansour Khalid, a northerner who served in Numeiri’s gov-
ernment until resigning after the 1983 September Laws, which introduced sharia law and 
Islamic punishments as part of the penal code across all Sudan.
   On  the  issue  of  riots  and  protests  by  Darfuris  and  other  northern  malcontents, 
see Khalid Mustafa Medani, “Black Monday: The Political and Economic Dimensions of 
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Third, by characterizing the con  ict as a religious one, Khartoum was 
able to recruit the military support required to wage war in the south. 
In November 1989, the GoS created the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) to 
supplement the army’s strength in the   eld. Mutasim Allah is forthright 
about the ways in which Khartoum used the rhetoric of jihad to recruit 
youth into the PDF and wreak havoc in southern Sudan. “The northern 
government recruited from the north and from the south . . . unfortunately 
recruiting young people from colleges and high schools under the name 
of Islam . . . saying, ‘Look, we are   ghting the non-Muslim enemy, we are 
declaring jihad!’”   Struggling to carry out its objectives against the SPLA 
using its conventional army, the government stoked religious fanaticism 
in order to recruit civilians into its security forces. Although PDF partici-
pation was voluntary, it was heavily promoted in schools, mosques, and 
through the media as the duty of virtuous Muslims. In 1992, the govern-
ment declared the war to be a jihad. In June 2000, Sudanese president 
Omar  al-Bashir  gave  the  eleventh  anniversary  speech  to  the  Popular 
Defense Forces, underlining the seriousness of their sacri  ce to the future 
of an Islamic state: “Sudanese youth are   ghting in the war zone, while 
other youths in the world are busy with discos and parties. We thank  
God that we have prepared these youths as the future of Sudan. God is 
Great.”   Yet the future for many of these youths would be less than great. 
Trained for only several months, given AK-47s, and sent to the south in 
“Jihad Convoys” to   ght on the front lines, thousands of PDF recruits lost 
their lives.  
Common threads run through the oral history accounts of Sudanese 
in the diaspora. One-dimensional narratives of religious incitement and 
ancient hatreds—a standard explanation for African con  icts in popular  
Sudan’s Urban Riots,” Middle East Report Online, 9 August 2005, about urban riots in Khar-
toum after the death of John Garang in 2005. It con  rms Yasir Hamata’s comments regard-
ing the disa fection felt by many Sudanese toward the ruling government.
   Mutasim Allah, interview by author, 5 December 2007. 
   Jago Salmon, A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defense Forces (Geneva: Small 
Arms Survey, 2007), 9.
   Mutasim Allah, interview by author, 5 December 2007, claims that as many as 80 per-
cent of those recruited were killed   ghting in the name of Islam. Unfortunately, there are 
no reliable numbers for PDF recruits. Reserve forces may be estimated at 75,000 between 
1992 and 2006, although active forces are estimated to have averaged 15,000 during that 
time with a spike in 1993 to 40,000. Even less is known about casualties, however it is gen-
erally agreed that government campaigns against southern SPLA strongholds in 1992–93 
and 1995 resulted in massive casualties among the poorly trained PDF. See Salmon, A Para-
military Revolution, 18, 19, 22, 26.
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accounts  by  the  Western  media—are  downplayed  in  favor  of  more 
nuanced narratives of longstanding socioeconomic inequalities and politi-
cal manipulation implicating the Government of Sudan. Furthermore, the 
GoS itself is seen to be the architect of the standard characterization of 
the civil war as a religious and ethnic con  ict. This   rst-hand assertion 
supports the scholarly observation that, “except when it is used as a pres-
sure mechanism for achieving other objectives,” religion is not the cen-
tral issue in Sudan’s con  ict.   Nevertheless, it is di   cult to deny that 
Khartoum’s  nationalist  project  to  fashion  Sudan  as  a  uni  ed  Islamist 
state meant the de facto politicization of religion, and therefore placed 
religious ideology and rhetoric at the heart of the struggle. Not surpris-
ingly then, the language of resistance to Khartoum’s “neocolonialism” by 
rebel groups—especially those in the south—mirrored the government’s 
methods of control.  
The SPLA, Christianity, and the Making of South Sudan
Southern leaders also seized upon religion as a “pressure mechanism” in 
their  struggle. At    rst,  arguments  for Christian  religious  freedom  were 
marshaled to   ght for a single pluralist state. Later on, however, such 
arguments were used in order to justify southern demands for political 
self-determination and independence.
Most  striking  was  the  way  in  which  my  informants  criticized  the 
manipulation of religious identity, yet these Sudanese—living in a plu-
ral American society—seemed unable to extricate themselves from the 
politicized language of religious di ference. Instead, to varying degrees, 
they cast themselves as participants in the con  ict using the same binary 
distinctions they understood to be used by Khartoum in its wars. There 
are several possible reasons why binaries were so frequently employed 
by those interviewed, especially southern Sudanese: First, many came to 
the US through church-based relief agencies and have a strong reason to 
identify with Christianity. Second, their identity as persecuted Christians 
provides access to material resources as well as a kind of cultural capi-
tal, especially in the American context where the framework of a cultural 
   Hasan and Gray, Religion and Con lict in Sudan, 47.
   See Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24.
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clash between Islam and the West dominates. Third, most southern Suda-
nese informants are young and less experienced, with the exception of 
Chol Alier, who is most resistant to simplistic explanations of the con  ict. 
And fourth, since they have su fered because of their identity as southern-
ers, it is a source of pride they intend to defend at all costs.
This  raises  important  questions  about  how  dyadic  constructions  of 
discourse may predetermine the kinds of historical production—and by 
extension,  future  social  imaginaries—available  to  southern  Sudanese. 
Binaries such as Muslim versus Christian, north versus south, and Arab 
versus African reinforce a particular set of interpretations and represen-
tations of Sudan’s past, foreclosing historical debate and resisting prob-
lematization. Is it possible that the paradigmatic opposition of an Arab 
Muslim north   ghting against an African Christian south constitutes a 
form of discourse so hegemonic that even Sudanese living in exile are 
unable to avoid it? When Sudanese engage in personal performances that 
recall their past utilizing these binaries, do they inadvertently suppress 
or distort historical truth by obscuring other cleavages that exist (such as 
intra-southern con  ict) or rule out alternative explanations (such as the 
politicized use of Christianity by southern leaders)? Is the oppositional 
binary such a compelling model that it shunts the personal memories of 
Sudanese refugees—with all the varied languages, diverse experiences, 
and con  icting logics—into a single master narrative? Whatever the case, 
silences within the testimony of southern Sudanese about the possible 
manipulation of their own Christian identity require further scrutiny.  
A  frequent  topic  of  discussion  within  the  diaspora  is  a  “crisis  of 
identity”—the lack of consensus on what it means to be Sudanese, and 
the resultant contests over the shape of an aspired southern state.   Peter 
   On the problems related to binary distinctions within historical interpretation, see 
Heidi Gengenbach, “Truth-telling and the Politics of Women’s Life History Research in 
Africa: A Reply to Kirk Hoppe,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 27, no. 3 
(1994): 619–27; and David Cohen, The Combing of History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 55, 95. On how exploring silences in historical memory can help recover the 
past, especially in the context of public commemorations and collective memory-making, 
see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1995).
   The “crisis of identity” idea is a prominent theme that emerges across the spectrum 
of scholarship on the Sudan. See Deng, War of Visions: Con lict of Identities in the Sudan; 
Paul Doornbos, “On Becoming Sudanese,” in Sudan: State, Capital, and Transformation, ed. 
Tony Barnett and Abbas Abdelkarim (New York: Croom Helm, 1988); Idris, Con lict and 
Politics of Identity in Sudan; and Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2007). For a good overview of Sudan’s identi  cation with the Arab world and 
the  ideological  function  of  notions  of  “blackness,”  see  Al-Baqir  Al-A  f  Mukhtar,  “The  
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Bok, for instance, identi  es the lack of a shared national identity as the 
reason behind the civil wars: “The war occurred because there is a crisis 
of identity in Sudan, we do not have a common de  nition we can agree 
upon.”    Processes  of  identity  formation—whether  one  de  nes  this  in 
terms of ethnic, regional, racial, religious or national a   liations (among 
the  most  pertinent  to  Sudan)—are  always  historically  contingent  and 
socially contested. Identity is both asserted and assigned, a socially con-
structed garb that one can don, or that is thrust upon one by others. Liisa 
Malkki elaborates on this idea: “Identity is always mobile and processual, 
partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condi-
tion, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories . . . a cre-
olized aggregate.”   In this sense, southern Sudanese have drawn upon 
individual memories of the past, reenactments of historical events (songs, 
rituals, or collective story-telling), and the promise of security in a “New 
Sudan” in order to shape an identity for themselves. At the same time, 
they have grappled with how to sometimes accept and often refashion the 
descriptions others have assigned to them: refugee, rebel, victim, second-
class citizen, foreigner, backward, and threat to the nation. The following 
vignettes demonstrate how historical production is closely bound up with 
processes of cultural preservation and identity formation.  
A  wispy  elder  in  Kakuma  refugee  camp  in  Kenya  delivers  his    nal 
charge to those leaving for the United States. He leads a group of youth 
in  a  responsorial  that  fuses  their  religious  identity  with  the  history  of 
southern Sudan: “Jesus Christ in my hand! SPLA in my hand!” A trusted 
custodian of the oral historical archive, he summarizes the past in one 
sentence: “We’ve been   ghting Arabs with guns and it has no end.” Then, 
in a double move that connects present events to the past, while looking 
to shape the future, he declares in raspy timbre, “Now our Lost Boys are 
Crisis of Identity in Northern Sudan: A Dilemma of a Black People with a White Culture,” a 
paper presented at the CODESRIA African Humanities Institute, Northwestern University, 
Evanston, 2007, and “Beyond Darfur: Identity and Con  ict in Sudan,” n.p.
   Peter Bok, “Sudan: A Future Beyond Genocide,” lecture given at Yale University, New 
Haven, CT, 7 November 2007. 
   Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of 
National Identity among Scholars and Refugees,” Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992): 37.
   The extent to which immigrant communities, generally, are concerned about cul-
tural preservation is illustrated in a project summary by IRIS, Global Traditions: Preserving 
and Sharing Traditions of Refugees and Immigrants in New Haven (New Haven: Integrated 
Refugee and Immigrant Services, n.d.).
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going to America because you are the future of Sudan.”   It is signi  cant 
that the old man’s charge began with an activation of the boys’ identity. 
The scene represents daily rituals in the camps that fuse Christianity and 
the SPLA struggle, rituals shaped by the historical memory of marginaliza-
tion, resistance, and exile. “Remember us back home . . . remember that 
you are the future of new Sudan,” urge those who remain in the camp. The 
admonition to remember the past creates a strong connection between 
the Sudanese diaspora and the southern political vision of a “New Sudan,” 
here tightly bound up with their Christian identity.
The SPLA’s political and military struggle, together with the language 
and rituals of Christianity, are also intertwined in commemorations of 
history  by  Sudanese  living  in  the  United  States.    All  of  the  southern 
Sudanese interviewed freely identi  ed themselves as Christians, and they 
mentioned  commemorative  holidays  as  a  central  means  of  preserving 
their distinct cultural identity and maintaining connections to family and 
friends at home. The three most important holidays include May 16, Janu-
ary 9, and December 25. That Christmas Day is named as a commemo-
rative holiday, credited with fostering a sense of shared identity among 
southern Sudanese, is signi  cant, especially since the other two holidays 
are speci  c to historical events of the second civil war. January 9 was 
described as a happy event—including processions in the streets, parties, 
food, and speeches by leaders in the community—to mark the signing of 
the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the   ght-
ing and established a power-sharing arrangement between the govern-
ment in Khartoum and the SPLA.
The most frequently mentioned commemoration, however, was South-
ern Sudan Liberation Day, which celebrates the founding of the Sudan 
People’s  Liberation  Movement  on  May  16,  1983.  Atem  Ajak,  Deng  Bol, 
and Diing Ayuel, three southern Sudanese studying at the University of 
Vermont in Burlington, enumerated the essential elements of this day: 
prayers,  songs,  traditional  dances,  drums,  happiness,  and  many  long 
speeches about the history of the struggle and the current political situ-
ation in Sudan.   Most often, these events are held in church halls. Their 
   Megan Mylan and Jon Shenk, directors, Lost Boys of Sudan (Actual Films/Principe 
Productions, 2003), DVD.
   For more on the impact of commemorations as part of the process of constituting 
historical knowledge, see David Cohen, The Combing of History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), 242–43.
   Atem Ajak, interview by author, 2 December 2007; Deng Bol, interview by author,   
2 December 2007; Diing Ayuel, interview by author, 2 December 2007.
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description matches a scene from the popular documentary, Lost Boys of 
Sudan, in which members of the diaspora have gathered to commemo-
rate Southern Sudan Liberation Day. A Sudanese pastor opens the gath-
ering with prayers, then delivers a message exhorting the young men to 
remember that they are the future of Sudan. The meeting culminates in 
war songs: “We’re marching on Khartoum! Prepare yourself Numeiri, we 
shall kill you with our AK-47s!”   Shocking perhaps to some viewers, the 
combination of prayers invoking the Christian God and war songs prom-
ising the murder of Jafaar al-Numeiri, President of Sudan when the war 
erupted, signals the subordination of Christian ethics to the politics of 
southern Sudanese nationalism. A powerful symbol of de  ance against 
Khartoum’s vision of an Islamist state, Christianity has been taken up as 
a defensive weapon; it simultaneously inspires southern Sudanese mili-
tarism and represents a threatened cultural and religious existence that 
Christians everywhere are called upon to defend.
Such memorialization rituals point to the importance of diasporic link-
ages and the function of religion in creating and sustaining what Benedict 
Anderson has famously called an “imagined community”—in this case, a 
southern national identity shaped by the common experience of oppres-
sion, warfare, and displacement.   While many southern groups, like the 
Dinka or the Nuer, have used migration as a means of survival since before 
recorded history, the alternatives they may pursue in the modern era as 
international refugees is unparalleled. Refugees in the United States, for 
instance, remain linked to kith and kin back home in a number of ways. 
Mobile phones, news media, and airplanes connect seemingly isolated 
villages and refugee camps to the wider world system. Because many of 
these migrants were selected by their families to resettle in the United 
States, they are expected to reciprocate by writing letters, making phone 
calls,  sending  remittances,  completing  paperwork  to  help  other  family 
members migrate, and returning to Sudan to visit and marry.   The pro-
duction and rehearsal of historical narratives around Christian persecu-
tion also maintains a psychological tie with those still in Sudan, while 
simultaneously  strengthening  bonds  of  solidarity  within  the  diaspora 
   Megan Mylan and Jon Shenk, directors, Lost Boys of Sudan (Actual Films/Principe 
Productions, 2003), DVD.
   Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re lections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
   Dianna J. Shandy, Nuer-American Passages: Globalizing Sudanese Migration (Gaines-
ville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 160.
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community.  For  many  southern  Sudanese,  assimilating  into  American 
culture carries the risk of letting their families down and their enemies 
win.   Commemorations of events in Sudan’s history that draw upon and 
reinforce the Muslim-Christian dichotomy have reminded southern Suda-
nese that their struggle will not end until a religiously-plural Sudanese 
state is established or, as recent history now bears witness, South Sudan 
gains independence.
For those who remained in southern Sudan, identi  cation with Christi-
anity was also a tactical move.   For civilians caught in the cross  re during 
the war, Christianity o fered a source of spiritual inspiration and protec-
tion. For rebel leaders, Christianity came to symbolize the possibility of 
political equality, community development, and self-determination. Many 
of the elite who headed the SPLM, the SPLA’s political wing, had previ-
ously adopted Christianity; like so many African leaders they received their 
education in mission schools. A number of early SPLA commanders were 
also self-professed Christians, who in their eagerness to galvanize south-
ern resistance actively encouraged Christian conversion.   In contrast to 
Khartoum’s  Islamist  state-building  project,  which  failed  to  incorporate 
religious and cultural others within its vision of the state, Christianity in 
the hands of the SPLA became a powerful tool for forging a pan-southern  
identity.  Overtures  to  the  Christian  West,  appeals  to  and  through  its 
diaspora, and rhetoric of martyrdom, oppression, and human rights were 
also  important  strategies  that  helped  the SPLA  connect  its  struggle  to 
the wider world of geopolitics. It has been argued that Christianity and 
Islam can be understood as two competing “social imaginaries,” which “in 
the wake of the recon  guration of African states” provide meaning and 
allow local practitioners to develop transnational connections and gen-
erate support.   The recent independence of South Sudan demonstrates 
the SPLA’s success in mobilizing these networks and making its case to 
the world. While it represents the attainment of legitimacy for the south 
   On the dangers of assimilation, see Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, 
and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), 202–10.
   For comparative discussions of the wartime turn to Christianity among southern 
Sudanese, see Andrew Wheeler, ed., Land of Promise: Church Growth in a Sudan at War 
(Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 1997).
   Hasan and Gray, Religion and Con lict in Sudan, 148.
   Brian Larkin and Birgit Meyer, “Pentecostalism, Islam and Culture: New Religious 
Movements in West Africa,” in Themes in West Africa’s History, ed. Emmanuel Kwaku 
Akyeampong (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 286–87.
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as a sovereign nation, it also represents the recon  guration of discursive 
boundaries and their inscription on the geopolitical map, with a concrete 
dividing line separating two Sudans—one Christian, marked by a struggle 
for justice and committed to pluralism, the other Islamic, marked by a 
strident Arab nationalism.
Another factor that in  uenced the mobilization of Christian identity 
by southern Sudanese is support from American evangelicals. There are 
at least two dimensions to this story. The   rst relates to the Sudanese 
diaspora in America and the prevalence of religious institutions acting as 
refugee resettlement agencies in the United States. This is especially the 
case for the resettlement of minors. Organizations such as Lutheran Social 
Services, Catholic Charities USA, and Episcopal Migration Ministries have 
facilitated their integration into American society upon their arrival, usu-
ally placing them with individual churches that o fer moral and mate-
rial support. The identity of Sudanese refugees as persecuted Christians 
played an important role in their social reconstruction—most American 
churches were eager to assist with the costs of their initial adjustment, 
and many provided ongoing support for education and travel.  
The second aspect of American evangelical support is the in  uence it 
had on forms of political mobilization, ideological legitimacy, and mili-
tary,   nancial, and logistical support that were instrumental in achieving 
southern Sudanese independence. The identi  cation of Christianity with 
the south became more important after the Cold War ended, an Islamist 
regime came to power in Sudan, and linkages with American churches 
translated into increased awareness among the American public about the 
war and international political pressure on Khartoum to end it.   Sarah 
Washburne, who has analyzed rebel leader John Garang’s speeches broad-
cast over Radio SPLA, notes that the issue of religion, ignored initially, 
appeared more frequently after 1989. Once Sadiq al-Mahdi’s pro-American 
   On southern Sudan as a symbol of contemporary Christian martyrdom in American 
churches, see Bixler, The Lost Boys of Sudan; Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars; 
and Shandy, Nuer-American Passages, 105–08.
   On  the  connections  between  the  Sudanese  diaspora,  American  evangelicals,  and 
Washington’s role in pushing for a peace agreement that would allow for an indepen-
dent South Sudan, see Shandy, Nuer-American Passages, and “Nuer Christians in America”; 
Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, “Southern Sudanese: A Community in Exile,” in Wanderings: 
Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 
49–71; and Sarah Lykes Washburne, “Opportunistic Identities? Discursive Trends of Legiti-
mation within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA),” in War and Peace in Africa, 
ed. Toyin Falola and Raphael Chijioke Njoku (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 
394–95.
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regime was replaced with an Islamist-oriented one in the NIF-backed coup 
in June of 1989, Garang turned up the heat on their Islamist credentials. 
He highlighted the “grim atmosphere of terror” in Sudan “unleashed by 
the fundamentalist Islamic junta,” calling the NIF an “apartheid regime,” 
with “delusions of grandeur.”   This kind of rhetoric was especially use-
ful after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, 
since it enabled Garang to portray the SPLA as a bulwark against Islamic 
forces and ally his movement with America’s “War on Terror.” But even 
before 9/11, the specter of Christian martyrdom and genocide grabbed 
the attention of US o   cials. Not long after taking o   ce in January 2000, 
President George W. Bush signaled America’s resolve to broker a peace 
deal in Sudan, saying: “There is perhaps no greater tragedy on the face of 
the Earth today.” US Secretary of State Colin Powell, meanwhile, called 
southern Sudan “a disaster area for all human rights.”  
There  are  those  who  doubt  that  the  SPLA’s  Christian  identi  cation 
gained it international support, but, considering the growing in  uence 
of  the  “Christian  Right”  in  American  politics  and  the  media’s  charac-
terization  that  a  “countrywide  grass-roots  mobilization . . . on  church 
and college campuses . . . propelled Sudan to the top of the new [Bush] 
administration’s Africa agenda,” it clearly had some e fect on US policy 
decisions. Garang may never have claimed that the SPLA was a Chris-
tian  organization;  however,  he  renounced  unequivocally  the  brand  of 
Islamism espoused by Khartoum. In many respects, this approach—of 
asserting their Christian religious identity while insisting on a pluralist 
political position—made the SPLA’s rhetoric even more e fective in the 
world of international relations, as they were able to appeal to American 
evangelicals, humanitarians, liberals, and neoconservatives all at the same 
time. Especially after 9/11, the White House showed a keen interest in the 
peace process, and it put pressure on both sides to sign the 2005 Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in which the idea of independence 
became a key feature.   The nearly 8,800 Sudanese expatriates living in 
the United States who cast their votes in the January 2011 referendum on 
South Sudan are a vivid demonstration of the convergent connections 
   Washburne, “Opportunistic Identities? Discursive Trends of Legitimation within the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA),” 389, 394.
   Jim Lobe, “Politics-US: Fight Brewing on Sudan Policy,” Inter Press Service, 1 June 
2001. 
   Washburn, “Opportunistic Identities? Discursive Trends of Legitimation within the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA),” 394–97.
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between the Sudanese diaspora, American evangelicals, and Washington’s 
foreign policy priorities.  
Ironically, the material and political advantages of southerners’ Chris-
tian identity were   rst pointed out to me by Muslims from Darfur. When 
asked why the war in South Sudan received so much attention in the 
United States while the Darfur con  ict is rarely publicized, Yasir Hamata 
opined, “Southern Christians have connections in the West because of 
Christianity . . . the people of Darfur are Muslims, they do not have [these] 
connections.”    His  observation  was  correct.  Many  American  evangeli-
cals aided southerners in their struggle against Khartoum because they 
saw themselves as helping “fellow Christians who are being persecuted,” 
and not just by any enemy, such as Marxist ideology or an authoritar-
ian dictator, but by a religious rival, Islam. Central to the solidi  cation of 
Christian identity among southern Sudanese is the knowledge that shared 
faith provides a ready connection to global sources of assistance, along 
with the expectation to help. Deng Bol recognized that the SPLA used 
religious a   nity networks to mobilize support during the con  ict, but he 
also believes it played a crucial role in achieving peace. “The CPA was 
signed as a result of pressure from evangelicals here in the USA. . . . my 
family members are high-ranking SPLA members involved in the peace 
process . . . . the SPLA was aware that evangelicals were lobbying US o   -
cials, who in turn pressured Khartoum.”  
Identities are often de  ned in opposition to the “other.” In the case of 
southern Sudanese, much of their identity has been de  ned in opposi-
tion to e forts at Islamization and Arabization, which emanated from the 
northern power center in Khartoum. When the   ghting began, the gov-
ernment took over the few schools that remained in the south, imposing 
Arabic and turning them into centers for radical Islamic teaching.   In 
the face of Khartoum’s propaganda, which tended to portray the south 
as a region dominated by tribal rivalries and indigenous religions, and 
badly in need of civilizing, Christianity o fered a more sturdy ideologi-
cal opponent, as one of the three “religions of the book” recognized by 
Islam. As part of their strategy to unify southerners under one common 
   Kim Severson, “Sudanese Expatriates Across the U.S. Cast Their Votes,” The New York 
Times, 9 January 2011.
   Yasir Hamata, interview by author, 30 November 2007.
   Deng Bol, interview by author, 2 December 2007.
   Lauren Servin, director, New Sudan Education Initiative (Lauren Servin Productions, 
2007), DVD; Mutasim Allah, interview by author, 5 December 2007; Diing Ayuel, interview 
by author, 2 December 2007.
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identity, SPLA leaders simultaneously promoted Christian conversion and 
described the armed struggle as a war to free southern Sudanese Chris-
tians from the unjust imposition of Islamic laws.   This resonates with 
Diing Ayuel’s assessment that a major cause of the war was the imposition 
of sharia law in the south.  
In the case of southern Sudan, the imposition of Islamic law by Khar-
toum gave southern leaders both the opportunity and the means necessary 
to mount a successful independence movement. By de  ning themselves 
in opposition to the Islamicist policies, southern Sudanese constructed 
an ethnoreligious Christian identity that allowed them to:   rst, contest 
northern claims for the superiority of Islamic civilization; second, unify 
the people of southern Sudan under a common banner; and third, use the 
solidarity resulting from a shared identity and a common enemy to reach 
out to foreign governments with Christian sympathies for support in their 
military and political struggle for autonomy.
Conclusion
The  politicization  of  religion  in  Sudan  has  been  bound  together  with 
processes of globalization in at least two important ways. First, from the 
perspective of local actors, the con  ict’s religious dimensions helped the 
northern government and southern rebels generate greater support, both 
within the region and from powerful nations and interest groups abroad. 
By invoking universal principles of Islam and Christianity, and appeal-
ing for foreign assistance through the language of jihad, martyrdom, and 
brotherly solidarity, Khartoum and the SPLA aligned themselves respec-
tively with the Muslim world and the Christian West. Such appeals had 
the double e fect of entrenching the con  ict between north and south 
and, at the same time, creating larger blocs of a   liation capable of tran-
scending ethnic or class divisions. The idea of South Sudan may have 
been conceived in the colonial era, but Khartoum’s wars gave birth to its 
reality. Second, Sudanese living in the diaspora have played an important 
role as emissaries of the new Sudan. Their perspectives have been shaped 
by their migration, and they have incubated an alternative vision of the 
nation, one that is independent from Khartoum’s control.
   Bixler, The Lost Boys of Sudan, 53.
   Diing Ayuel, interview by author, 2 December 2007.
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It is evident from interviews with members of the Sudanese diaspora, as 
well as publications and   lms on the topic, that violence has left an indel-
ible mark on the history of Sudan. Religion and religious rhetoric, central 
to mobilization and resistance e forts, have had an equally pervasive in  u-
ence. Although religious identity is just one form of self-understanding, 
it has served as a particularly powerful mobilizing force in cutting across 
other markers, such as gender, class, and race. The potential for religion 
to divide as well as unify challenges any monocausal understanding of 
its role in warfare and state formation. This chapter has attempted to 
understand the production and dissemination of a discourse that places 
religious opposition at the center of the Sudanese con  ict, sketching out 
ways in which religion has been mobilized locally to form uni  ed blocs 
capable of transcending internal divisions and enlisting the support of 
powerful international allies.
What emerges from oral histories of the Sudanese diaspora is not a 
story of war as the inevitable consequence of two proselytizing religions at 
loggerheads, but a contingent history characterized by the manipulation 
of religion by ruling elites for political ends. That said, all the Sudanese 
interviewed—Muslim  and  Christian,  northerner  and  southerner,  Arab 
and African—acknowledged that the northern government in Khartoum 
as well as the SPLA in the south have used religion as a polarizing rhe-
torical device, emphasizing religious duty in order to mobilize popular 
support for warfare and advance their competing political visions for the 
future.
Now that a two-state solution to has become reality, it remains to be 
seen whether either government will be able to move beyond the model 
of  ethnoreligious  nationalism,  with  its  exclusionary  and  homogenizing 
tendencies. Troubles in Darfur illustrate rather tragically how this is an 
ongoing challenge in the northern case. In South Sudan, as the SPLM set-
tles into the day-to-day work of governing an independent state, its suc-
cess and legitimacy will depend on its ability to resist corruption, deliver 
basic  services,  improve  infrastructure,  and  balance  competing  ethnic 
groups and interests. Ruling elites will need to avoid the temptation to use 
military force against their political competition. Nor can the SPLM make 
exclusive claims on the title “liberator of the people,” for the vision of a 
new Sudan was born out of the struggle by Sudanese in many regions and 
of di ferent faiths, nurtured in a global diaspora stretching from refugee 
camps in Kenya to cities in America. If South Sudan is to succeed, it will 
have to embrace a vision of the nation in which all citizens participate 
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freely in civic life. Such a vision re  ects the longue durée of Sudan’s history,  
which has more often than not been characterized by the cosmopolitan 
co-existence of a convergence of languages, religions, and cultures.
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